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INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance has become a main subject of numerous recently academic studies worldwide. Denis (2001) demonstrates that this terminology is more popular in both academic and practical scope. Besides, the firms have to face their own decisions in finding the most appropriate financing resource, which strongly incorporates with governance. One of the concerned issues which has been most studied by researchers is the interests conflict between the most powerful stakeholders of the firm, called controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders by the studies of Berle and Means (1991) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) . Meanwhile, Wang and Xiao (2011); Qian et al. (2010) also represents the existence of expropriation (also called tunneling and its nature of intercorporate Asian Economic and Financial Review loan in firms). Furthermore, La Porta et al. (1999) ; Claessens et al. (2000) and Claessens et al. (2000) shows that expropriation in Asian countries was caused by weak corporate governance, which is considered as the most challenging aspects. Since then, many studies figure out one method to constrain the amount of expropriation is the use of debt, specifically bank loans. The role of bank financing in corporate governance is also an important topic for many recent researches, and plays a key role in firm's management and performance (Yazdanfar and Öhman, 2015) . Nevertheless, many researches regarding the relationship between bank financing and corporate governance through tunneling are still insufficient because the difficulties in measuring this variable exist. In the previous period, the main method for evaluating this element is by market reaction at the time, which related party transactions are announced such as Peng et al. (2011) ; Bae et al. (2002) ; Faccio and Stolin (2006) ; and . Interestingly, this factor is also estimated by the level of related party transactions in accordance with the studies of Juliarto et al. (2013) and Gao and Kling (2008) . Despite of the difficulties, some researchers find that the aforementioned relationship with both positive and negative effects in Qian and Yeung (2015) and Boubaker (2005) respectively. Vietnam is one of the emerging stock markets with many potential opportunities so that it might suffer from an impact of tunneling in corporate governance, operations, which affects future performance. Therefore, the estimation for expropriation in terms of bank financing and corporate governance with country's study is necessary to deliver the sensible implications.
LITERATURE REVIEW
As the tunneling problem has turned globally, many researches have been carried on to find the ways control the growth of it. There are some empirical studies conducted in the past to investigate the relationship between debt and corporation through tunneling by different methodologies in diversified period as well as geographical scopes. Debt is the factor that they are looking for. In their pioneering analysis of the agency problem between professional managers and dispersed shareholders, Jensen and Meckling (1976) also examined and developed this argument. Therefore, debt can be used as a control tool, which affects corporate governance. However, the other researches results are vary, some of them has supported this hypothesis such a Brealey et al. (1977); Diamond (1991) . In contrast, some did not consolidate it, they reveal the other aspect of debt, which is a tool for expropriation, which refers to and Wiwattanakantang (1999) while some show limited evidence to conclude whether there is a relation between debt and governance in accordance with Sarkar and Sarkar (2008) . The reason for the heterogeneous of results might be the difference in sample selection between each country (for example, developed versus developing countries), the methodology selection (for instance, OLS, Granger Causality, co-integration, Error correction models, etc.) or the period chosen, etc. The table below indicates several past researches about the relation between debt and corporate governance. Recently, many studies that focus on the effectiveness of debt to corporate governance through expropriation are still very limited and the results have been inconclusive in overall. Vietnam also has effort to pay attention in corporate governance, typically by introducing a number of changes in the Vietnamese Enterprises Law, which is valid in 2014. The investors and shareholders' rights are clearly better protected although some extents of governance remain unclear by the study of Owoeye and Pijl (2016) which facilitates to expropriation and researches about the way to solve this problems
has not yet been published. To date various methods have been developed and introduced to examine the impact of debt on corporate governance through tunneling in many researches, such as cross-sectional ordinary least square regressions by the studies of Qian and Yeung (2015) or El-Chaarani (2015) multivariate estimation as Barros et al. (2013) panel data regressions as Wiwattanakantang (1999 
IDENTIFICATION AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

Financing Decisions and Expropriation
The controlling shareholders often decides to withdraw assets and cash from firms or not, they take into account to perform their trade off in short-term and long-term interest. It might trigger higher future cost of capital when approaching new financing sources. The activities done by the majority shareholders to transfer these equivalent benefits by occupying in the periods are called 'tunneling' or 'expropriation'.
Due to this phenomenon, the majority shareholders seem to negatively influence minority ones if they expect to have new financing. However, it exists distinguishing features when choosing the capital market funding or debt financing. The financing by bank loan will support firms to avoid the problems regarding corporate governance.
Therefore, firms use secured loan from banking system at reasonable costs to control the tunneling. Furthermore, firms need to recognize the effects of these criteria on firms' performance towards expropriation.
Research Hypotheses
The authors construct three research hypotheses to test empirical evidence regarding the effect of tunneling on debt financing as well as firm's performance as follows:
H1: The tunneling is an element run by corporate governance to predict firm future performance H2: The relationship between tunneling and bank loan financing The authors use controlling shareholders' borrowing from firms to calculate tunneling (or expropriation, called intercorporate loans as in the study of Jiang et al. (2010) . The main variable used in this paper is 'tunneling' or 'expropriation' is under term of 'other receivables' (ORECTA), which is different with trade receivables under the practices of using title 'account receivables'. Then, this variable separates with the ordinary business transactions. 
Methodology
In this study, the authors employ both Fixed Estimated Model (FEM) and Random Estimated Model (REM)
for all the research models with panel data. The FEM model is allow reflecting the unique feature of individual units and it also appropriate in situations, where the individual specific intercept may be correlated with one or more factors but consumes many degrees of freedom when the number of cross-sectional units is very large.
Meanwhile, the REM model is assumed that the intercept value of an individual unit is a random drawing from a much larger population with a constant mean and is appropriate in situations where the (random) intercept of each cross-sectional unit is uncorrelated with the elements. Next, the authors will use the Hausman Test to choose consistent model (FEM or REM). Afterwards, Heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and endogeneity test will be performed for each research models in order to ensure that these models are persistent, consistent and unbiased.
Finally, the authors decide to eliminate all concerns regarding models by using system Generalized Method of Moments (system-GMM) as well as Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) by Blundell and Bond (2000) ; Blundell and Bond (1998) and Lee (2007) . If system-GMM result cannot be concluded because of the p-value of the first autocorrelation test is significance and the p-value of the second autocorrelation test is not significance, then, 2SLS regression will be used to estimates to find the consistent and persistent model, which can be explained.
SUMMARY STATISTICS
The panel below demonstrates the features of 250 researched firms with the initial statistics. 
RESEARCH MODELS AND CORRELATION MATRIX
Research Models
The authors propose the research models to estimate and test the empirical for the above hypotheses.
It denotes that ROAi,(t+1) is the future firm's performance whereas ROAi,t demonstrates the current situation of firm performance on the criteria of Return On Assets. R_ORECTA is the ranking of 'Other Receivables', which is collected from financial statements. In order to ensure the persistent without omitting variables, the authors choose the groups of vectors for controlling variables, which denotes . Similarly, the other research variable is ROE (Return On Equity), EBITTA (EBIT over total assets), respectively.
The two model above aims to investigate the three main relationship between total bank loan over total assets and other receivables (as tunnel), other loan over total assets and expropriation, the financial leverage and the activity of withdrawing cash and assets by the controlling shareholders. It also includes the group of controlling vectors variables here.
The last three models tries to explain the interaction of both ORECTA and bank loan (denotes R_ORECTA multiple with TLTA) to firm performance in the future.
Correlation Matrix
There are three table of correlation matrix among the variables for three models. In the first 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
The Prediction of Other Receivables to Firms' Future Performance
In this part, the authors discuss the results extracted from the regression approach by doing with three proposed kinds of model above. Before explaining the results shown on the table 6 and 7 above, the authors decides to test Hausman through the study of Durbin (1954) to choose the most appropriate as well as careful observation the research variables at any significance level for further investigation. By doing this, the authors will avoid the error in choosing models in regression models. We also perform the further test to ensure the persistent, consistent and unbiased model here. The authors will choose the fixed-estimation-models to explain but we double-check with the other errors, which might arise from panel data regression. This test is a base to choose the appropriate model between models using fixed or random effect model. As results have shown, the Hausman p-values in all models are less than 0.05, so the null hypothesis (H0) in models is rejected which means that the coefficients estimated by the efficient random effects estimator are not the same as the ones estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator. This leads to a selection of choosing the fixed effect method for all models will be more consistent to conclude. Overall, the coefficient at significance level of each method used in regression all there models have partly signed the relation between the variables. However, to let this results be appropriate to give the final conclusions, the authors need to perform more statistical hypothesis tests to exam whether the models have problems or not, repair them by other methods and choose the most suitable models for conclusion. As the results shown above, the model 1.1.; 1.2. and 1.3. are not persistent with three errors, which can be caused such as heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and endogeneity. Hence, the authors propose the system-GMM with two stages to eliminate this phenomenon.
The model regressed by system-GMM is persistent if there is a significance in the first autocorrelation of residual and none in the second autocorrelation.
The results, as shown in Table 8 , indicate that the first autocorrelation p-values for three models are all 0.000 less than 0.05, so there are all significance. The second autocorrelation p-values of three models are 0.109, 0.197 and 0.501 more than 0.1, so there is no significance. These information leads to the assertion that the three models are persistent and their results are conclusion. A negative correlation has found between R_ORECTA in year t and ROA, ROE and EBITTA in the (t+1) (response variables) in each of the three models, which significance at level 10%, 5% and 1%. In contrast, ROA, ROE and EBITTA influence positively to their value in the next year at significance level 1%, 5% and 1%. However, firm size has a negative tendency to ROE and EBITTA in the following at level 5% and 1%. These strong evidences conduct to a conclusion that we can tunneling as predictor of firm future performance, typically tunneling is destroying value to firm future performance. The value of ROA, ROE and EBITTA have a significance impact on their value in the future, while firm size only effects on the value of ROE and EBITTA in a negative tendency. 
Bank Loan, Leverage and Other Receivables by Random Effect
This section will show the regression ORECTA on bank loan and financial leverage in model 2.1 and 2.2. by fixed and random effect model method. The other control variables are liabilities other than bank loan, firm size, book to market and governance variables such as managerial ownership, board size, independence, institutional ownership and audit. The result table of fixed effect model shows that bank loan and leverage all have a significant negatively effect on ORECTA at the level 5%. Firm size and auditing in two models also have a positive impact on ORECTA at a significant level 1%. Such variables as managerial ownership, board size, independence and institution ownership omitted since the data of them in Vietnam still restricted in some aspects. As for the result of using random effect model, the tendency and the level of significant for the relation between bank loan, leverage, firm size, auditing and ORECTA are still the same as the results using the fixed effect model method.
The percentage of the liabilities other than bank loan over total assets significantly negative affects ORECTA in model 2.2 at a level 10%. In addition, institution ownership has a negative impact on dependent variable in two models at a significant rate 1%.
© 2017 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved. regress ORECTA on the ratio of bank loan over total assets and other firm characteristics to find the impact of bank loans on other receivables by using fixed effect model. There are 2,745 observations from the period 2006-2016. The dependent variable is other receivables divided by total assets (ORECTA). The explanatory variables include bank loan scaled by total assets, firm size, book to market, and other liabilities, governance variables such as managerial ownership, board size, independence, audit, year and firm fixed effects. We also regress ORECTA on leverage and other control variables to demonstrate that leverage also effects on ORECTA. Standard errors are clustered by firm and reported in parentheses. Significant level at the 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted *, ** and *** respectively. (Source: The authors) regress ORECTA on the ratio of bank loan over total assets and other firm characteristics to find the impact of bank loans on other receivables by using fixed effect model. There are 2,745 observations from the period 2006-2016. The dependent variable is other receivables divided by total assets (ORECTA). The explanatory variables include bank loan scaled by total assets, firm size, book to market, and other liabilities, governance variables such as managerial ownership, board size, independence, audit, year and firm fixed effects. We also regress ORECTA on leverage and other control variables to demonstrate that leverage also effects on ORECTA. Standard errors are clustered by firm and reported in parentheses. Significant level at the 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted *, ** and *** respectively.
(Source: The authors)
After test of Hausman, the authors choose the fixed-estimation-models and these models 2.1. and 2.2. are errors in heteroscedasticity, auto-correlation and endogeneity. by the p-value of the first autocorrelation is significant (p-value AR (1) = 0.000 < 0.05) and of the second autocorrelation is not significant (p-value AR (2) in model 2.1 equals 0.559 and in model 2.2 equals 0.166 more than 0.05), which can affirm that the results of this model is final conclusion. It can be seen from the results that bank loan ratio and leverage all have a significant negative impact on ORECTA in each model at the level 1% and 5%. The financial leverage of other loan, firm size, book to market, institution ownership and independence also have negative effects on ORECTA at 5% for the first four factors and 1% for last one. In conclusion, there is a significant negative relation between bank loan and ORECTA as well as between leverage and ORECTA, which means firms can use bank loan as a control tool for the amount of tunneling.
The Interaction of Both ORECTA and Bank Loans on Firm Performance
The authors also perform the fixed-effects model as well as random-effects model. Afterwards, we test of
Hausman to choose fixed to become the most appropriate model but this method has errors in heteroscedasticity, auto-correlation and endogeneity. Interestingly, the authors choose system-GMM to regress with instrument variables but the auto-correlation in the second level without satisfaction. Therefore, the authors decide to choose 2SLS to perform the regression model for the interaction of both ORECTA and bank loans on firm performance. This panel indicates the use system-GMM for model 3.1., 3.2. and 3.3. about the effect of interaction between ORECTA and bank loans on firm performance to remove the factors which violate the assumption of Estimation Cross-sectional models. The dependent variables are ROA, ROE and EBITTA in year (t+1) for each model. The independent variables are ROA, ROE and EBITTA in year t and R_ORECTA, respectively and other control variables. The independent variables are ROA, ROE, EBITTA and R_ORECTA in year t, respectively. The authors uses the rank of ORECTA (R_ORECTA) for the interaction of ORECTA and bank loans. This rank has ten deciles and taken number between zero and one (R_ORECTA equals one for firms in the highest ORECTA decile and equals zero for firms in the lowest decile and the gap between each decile is allocated evenly). The total observations are 2,500 from 250 listed firms in Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange in 10 years, period 2007-2016. Standard errors are clustered by firm and reported in parentheses. Significant level at the 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted *, ** and *** respectively.
(Source: The authors) Surprisingly, no variables in the system-GMM are significance at any level though 1%, 5% or 10%. Therefore, the authors choose 2SLS with instrument variables to regress and fix the errors arising from these methods. This panel indicates the use 2SLS regression for model 3.1., 3.2. and 3.3. about the effect of interaction between ORECTA and bank loans on firm performance to remove the factors which violate the assumption of Estimation Cross-sectional models. The dependent variables are ROA, ROE and EBITTA in year (t+1) for each model. The independent variables are ROA, ROE and EBITTA in year t, R_ORECTA, respectively, and other control variables. The independent variables are ROA, ROE, EBITTA and R_ORECTA in year t, respectively. The authors uses the rank of ORECTA (R_ORECTA) for the interaction of ORECTA and bank loans. This rank has ten deciles and taken number between zero and one (R_ORECTA equals one for firms in the highest ORECTA decile and equals zero for firms in the lowest decile and the gap between each decile is allocated evenly). The total observations are 2,500 from 250 listed firms in Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange in 10 years, period 2007-2016. Standard errors are clustered by firm and reported in parentheses. Significant level at the 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted *, ** and *** respectively. (Source: The authors) By using the 2SLS regression for three last models, the table has shown the final findings that the interaction of R_ORECTA and bank loan has significance negative effects on all ROA, ROE and EBITTA in the next year at the highest level 1%. The ratio of other loan over total assets affects in negative sign on response variables in three models at level 10% in model 3.2 and at level 1% in the other two models. In contrast, ROA, ROE and EBITTA in year t influence positively on their values in the following year at a significant level 1%. Institution ownership also has positive impact on the dependent variables in all models at level 1% in the model 3.1 and 3.3 and level 5% in model 3.2. Overall, the relationship of other receivables and bank loan has a negative correlation on future firm performance. ROA, ROE, EBITTA in year t affect the same direction to their values in the next year.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The empirical results provide evidences that tunneling is destroying value to firm future performance. The amount of tunneling, which is presented by other receivables, has a negative sign to the value of return on assets, return on equity and earnings before interest and taxes in the future. This means that if the amount of other receivables represents the expropriation of the controlling shareholders in the present year increases because of their desires, the value of return on assets, return on equity and earnings before interest and taxes in the following year will drop significantly, which leads to the decrease of firm performance. Through this research, the authors has interestingly found that the ratio of existing bank loan over total assets impact through a negative sign on other receivables. This means that if the amount of bank loans grows moderately, the value of tunneling will decrease gradually. It can be explained that when firm has accessed to bank financing which signals the obligation between firm and the bank must be performed in the future, controlling shareholders will become more concerned about the reputation loss and maybe higher capital cost in the future if they need an external financing. Therefore, the amount of expropriation form firm drops. From this evidence, firms could use bank financing as a discipline tool for tunneling. This finding has important implications for developing corporate governance through the usage of bank financing as the amount of bank financing increases, the amount of other receivables decreases, so the benefits of minority shareholders are not stolen and conflict between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders will be eased. In the results of the last three models, the impact between the interaction of other receivables and bank loan ratio on the value of firm future performance is following a positive correlation.
This means that if a firm has a huge amount of other receivables represents tunneling at the same time with a large amount of bank loan in the present year, the firm future performance will go down significantly. As a firm with over extended bank loan amount, high financial leverage could easily get in an insolvency period or maybe bankruptcy and the corporate governance of this company is weak which the controlling shareholders do not care about the reputation, value or present performance of the firm so the firm future will fall down in many aspects.
As regards managers and investors, the finding has important implications for them. For managers, they should consider to use bank financing as a control tool for governance as bank loan is plentiful financing as it easy to access, reliable and a fast provider for the lack of capital in firm operations with a reasonable and economic. Also, the usage of bank financing controls the amount of tunneling and ease the interest conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, which makes the governance of firm more stable and stronger. However, if the managers overuses the amount of bank loan that extents the ability to pay bank of the company, the firm will easily get in the insolvency or bankruptcy situation which could destroy it reputation and increase the cost of capital in the future. For the investors, they should really be careful when they are selecting a company to invest in. They should concern, evaluate the firm performance and finding the information about the firm transactions, activities as some might represent tunneling which could affect in a negative sign to the benefits of their investment. They also need to aware of the amount of bank financing which the company is used as not any firms with huge amount of bank loan signal a good and strong corporate governance as always. Most importantly, they should know and learn their rights of minority or controlling shareholders depends on their status to prevent the loss of their own benefits.
When it comes to policy-maker, evidence in the research suggest that the efficiency in the usage of bank financing is important for corporate governance. However, if firms can easily access to bank loans even with a weak and unreliable financial statement, the controlling shareholders will not concerned for anything like reputation loss or obligation to pay back. This will also dilute the discipline power of the capital market. Therefore, policy makers should be aware and make a strict policy and regulation about the bank loan term and conditions that the amount of bank loan. Furthermore, the possibility to lend should not only be based on the number in financial statements but also rely on the plans, strategy and cash flow of business project as well as the governance situation of firm and the ability to pay back to the bank.
